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On the Legal Effects of Sponsalia
This article challenges the traditional view that informal sponsalia (as described in D� 23,1) 
were legally unenforceable in classical Roman law� After a close examination of the contents and 
structure of D� 23,1 and related Digest texts, it offers a new interpretation of a crucial passage 
from Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 4�4), which has traditionally been read as showing that Ro-
man sponsalia were unenforceable� The article then concludes with a consideration of the literary 
evidence offered by Varro, Plautus and Ovid� – Keywords: Betrothal, legal validity, Latin practice
Über die rechtlichen Wirkungen von Sponsalia. Gegen die wohl herrschende Meinung ar-
gumentiert dieser Beitrag, dass informelle sponsalia (wie in D� 23,1 beschrieben) nach klassi-
schem Recht klagbar waren� Nach Analyse der in D� 23,1 enthaltenen und sachlich verwandten 
Digesten-Stellen wird eine neue Deutung eines Textes von Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 4�4) 
präsentiert, der bislang als Beweis dafür angesehen wurde, dass sponsalia in Rom nicht einklag-
bar waren� Auch Zeugnisse bei Varro, Plautus und Ovid scheinen die hier vertretene Auffassung 
zu stützen�
I� When two people become engaged to be married, what are the legal con-
sequences? In current English law the position is clear: There are none, actions for 
“breach of promise” being abolished by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 19701)� The position in classical Roman law, if we are to believe the textbooks, 
was the same, although Roman law had no equivalent of the emphatic English legis-
lation� One thing that both Roman and English law definitely had in common, how-
ever, was that in earlier times the position had been different� No less a figure than 
Ulpian vouched for the practice among the veteres of making binding contractual 
promises by way of stipulation in respect of their future wives2)� The prominence 
of the verb spondeo in such stipulations had given the engagement the name “spon­
salia”, and also explained why the man to be married was called sponsus and his 
bride-to-be sponsa3)� The consensus is, however, that by the classical period – and 
certainly by the time that Ulpian was writing – such stipulations, and stipulations be-
tween the parties to the intended marriage themselves were, as Thomas puts it, “not 
actionable”4)�
1) Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 s 1(1)�
2) D� 23,1,2� 
3) D� 23,1,3� Varro, ling� 6,69–6,70�
4) J �A�C� Thomas , Textbook of Roman Law, Amsterdam 1976, 420� See also 
A� Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, Transactions of the Ameri-
can Philosophical Society, vol� 43 part 2, Philadelphia 1953, 713; W� Buckland/ 
P� S te in , A Text-Book of Roman Law, Cambridge 31963, 112, n� 5; P� Corbe t t , 
The Roman Law of Marriage, Oxford 1930, 14–15; B�W� Fr ie r /T�A�J � McGinn, 
A Casebook on Roman Family Law, Oxford 2004, 65, 71; R� As to l f i , Il Fidanza-
mento nel Diritto Romano, 31994, 2� The main secondary literature specifically di-
rected to sponsalia is H� Kupiszewski , Das Verlöbnis im altrömischen Recht, ZRG 
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If this accepted account of the decline in legal significance of sponsalia is true, 
it raises an interesting question about the relationship between legal change and 
social practice� For there is no sign of sponsalia losing their social significance in 
the classical period� On the contrary, as Treggiari has shown, the word “sponsalia” 
should often be understood as referring to the celebrations accompanying the en-
gagement, specifically the banquet, rather than the engagement itself5)� We find, 
for example, Cicero using sponsalia and convivium interchangeably in a letter to 
Quintus6); and Seneca, in his De Beneficiis, invoking – as an illustration of what 
our moral duties require of us – the example of a person getting up to go to spon­
salia despite (already) suffering from indigestion7)� The hint in Seneca that attend-
ance at betrothal feasts could be as much a matter of social obligation as pleasure 
is made explicit by the younger Pliny, in a letter reflecting that frequent attendance 
at sponsalia was one of the tedious chores of urban life8)� Indeed, there seems to 
have been a wider concern about excessive, ostentatious sponsalia: Suetonius re-
ports that the emperor Claudius endeared himself to the Roman people by his self-
effacement and modest lifestyle, which latter included the decision to celebrate his 
daughter’s engagement silentio et tantum domestica religione (“with great privacy, 
at home”)9)� Seneca, this time in De Tranquillitate Animi, nicely captures the sense 
of a significant familial event bloating into a meaningless public display when he 
lists attendance at the sponsalia of people who often marry alongside going to hear 
the latest claim brought by a vexatious litigant; these, he explained, were exactly 
the kinds of activities that distracted people from doing something truly worth-
while10)�
II� People might have wasted their time listening to claims brought by obses-
sive litigants, or attending the engagement parties of serial spouses, but it seems that 
they could never be distracted by legal claims arising from broken engagements� Any 
investigation of the legal effects of sponsalia has to begin with Digest book 23 chap-
ter 1, which contains eighteen texts� After a crisp definition of betrothal as mentio et 
repromissio nuptiarum futurarum (D� 23,1,1 “the announcement and mutual promise 
of marriage in the future”), the compilers turned their attention to etymology� Ulpian, 
in his Liber singularis de sponsalibus, had said that: 
D� 23,1,2 Sponsalia autem dicta sunt a spondendo: nam moris fuit veteribus stipulari 
et spondere sibi uxores futuras�  
“Betrothal” was so called from the “solemn plighting of troth”, since it was cus-
tomary for our ancestors to stipulate and solemnly promise their wives-to-be to 
each other�
RA 77 (1960) 125; Idem, Studien zum Verlöbnis im klassischen römischen Recht I, 
ZRG RA 84 (1967) 70; R� As to l f i , Per la storia del fidanzamento arcaico, SDHI 58 
(1992) 272; R� As to l f i , Il fidanzamento nel diritto romano, 31994; and C� Fayer, 
La Familia Romana, Aspetti giuridici ed antiquari, 2�: Sponsalia, Matrimonio, Dote, 
2005 ch� 1�
 5) S � Treggiar i , Roman Marriage, Oxford 1991, 147�
 6) Cicero l� c� 2�5�
 7) Sen�, benef� 4,39�
 8) Pliny l� c� 1�9�
 9) Suet�, Claud� 12� 
10) Sen�, dial� (De Tranquillitate Animi) 9,12�
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The origin of betrothals in stipulations using spondere also explained why the en-
gaged couple were known as sponsus and sponsa (D� 23,1,3)� However, as the fourth 
text in the chapter, from Ulpian’s ad Sabinum, made clear, stipulations were no longer 
necessary: 
D� 23,1,4 Sufficit nudus consensus ad constituenda sponsalia� Denique constat et 
absenti absentem desponderi posse, et hoc cotidie fieri�  
Agreement alone is sufficient for betrothal� It is agreed that betrothal can take place 
in the absence of the parties, and this is quite common�
This emphasis on informality, and the centrality of consent, was echoed in a text 
from Paul (D� 23,1,7), and was reinforced by extracts from a range of jurists dealing 
with problems of consent� For instance, both parties had to be old enough to under-
stand the nature of the transaction (D� 23,1,14), and while a daughter in power had 
to consent to betrothal, her consent was presumed and could only be withheld on 
specific grounds (D� 23,1,11–12)� A son in power, by contrast, seems to have had an 
unrestricted freedom to refuse (D� 23,1,13)� The jurists also addressed issues such as 
the powers of tutors (D� 23,1,6; D� 23,1,15), the effect of insanity and long delay on 
betrothals (D� 23,1,8; D� 23,1,17), and whether prohibitions on senatorial marriages 
applied by analogy to betrothals (D� 23,1,16)� The chapter ends with Ulpian reassert-
ing the lack of formal requirements for creating sponsalia: 
D� 23,1,18 In sponsalibus constituendis parvi refert, per se (et coram an per inter-
nuntium vel per epistulam) an per alium hoc factum est�  
When betrothals are being contracted, it does not matter much whether this is done 
by the parties themselves (in person, by sending a messenger, or by letter) or by 
someone else�
The detail and elaborate analysis in these texts seems at first sight difficult to rec-
oncile with the idea that these agreements were not binding� The explanation offered 
by writers such as Berger, Buckland and Corbett is that although the promises were 
unenforceable, the status of sponsus or sponsa had certain legal consequences11)� Cor-
bett listed the following seven points12): 
(a) two simultaneous engagements, or marriage to one person whilst engaged to 
another, entails infamia;
(b) betrothal created a kind of affinity: a son may not marry his father’s sponsa, 
nor a father his son’s;
(c) a sponsus was entitled to prosecute his sponsa for infidelity;
(d) gifts and legacies from sponsus to sponsa and vice versa were exempt from 
limitations;
(e) betrothal exempts a sponsus from the penalties of celibacy imposed by the lex 
Julia;
(f) a sponsus could not be compelled to give evidence against his fiancee’s father;
(g) the murder of a sponsus or a sponsa came within the definition of parricide�
On this interpretation, D� 23,1 had a legal function, but it was merely to provide a 
definition of a concept used elsewhere� Nothing in D� 23,1 itself, it should be stressed, 
indicates that this is the case� Equally striking is the fact that nowhere in D� 23,1 is 
11) Berger  (Fn� 4) 713; Buckland/Ste in  (Fn� 4) 112 – “it was important to have 
rules as to what were valid sponsalia”; Corbet t  (Fn� 4) 16–17�
12) Corbe t t  (Fn� 4) 16–17�
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there any statement that betrothals do not give rise to legal rights in the parties� It 
would have been easy to say so, but the logic of the texts actually points the other way� 
The description of the stipulatory practices of the veteres in 23,1,2, which undoubtedly 
were enforceable, is never contradicted or contrasted with a more contemporary posi-
tion of unenforceability� Of course, the chapter shows that the law governing sponsalia 
has changed since the time of the veteres in that the requirements for a valid stipulation 
need no longer be satisfied� It does not matter that the parties were not physically pres-
ent, nor that they did not use the formal promissory language spondesne?/spondeo� 
But the gist of the juristic extracts is that one achieves the same results as the veteres 
without having to go through all the stipulatory formalities: The way of making spon­
salia has changed, but their effects have not� What is being described, in other words, 
is something akin to the informal contracts of sale, hire partnership and mandate13)� 
On this approach, it becomes easier to understand why sponsalia attracted the lively 
juristic discussion evidenced in D� 23,1� Florentinus, Gaius, Julian, Modestinus, Paul, 
Pomponius and Ulpian were all writers of the classical era or later� If sponsalia were 
not binding, these authors’ interest in the subject could only be explained either in 
terms of an enthusiasm for the seven arcane points listed by Corbett, or by a taste for 
legal history� It would be especially surprising to find Ulpian’s name in this list; he 
apparently wrote a monograph on sponsalia, but it is difficult to imagine him having 
either the time or the inclination for pottering about in the bye-ways of Roman law14)� 
A legally binding contract, on the other hand, with its own peculiar rules, would be 
perfectly suited to detailed analysis in a short book� 
III� The texts of D� 23,1 provide the vast majority, but not all, of the Digest’s dis-
cussion of sponsalia� We now turn to consider two further texts, which might, at first 
sight, appear to suggest that sponsalia did not give rise to legally binding agreements� 
First, Gaius (11 ad ed� prov�) states that 
D� 24,2,2 In sponsalibus quoque discutiendis placuit renuntiationem intervenire 
oportere: in qua re haec verba probate sunt: ‘condicione tua non utor’�  
It is agreed that in order to end betrothals a renunciation must be made� Here the 
established words are: ‘I do not accept your conditions’15)�
The text does not discuss the legal consequences that follow such a renunciation, 
but the context of Gaius’ discussion might be suggestive� D� 24,2,2 is part of a longer 
passage discussing divorces, and it might be tempting to infer that, just as a divorce 
could not lead to a claim for breach of contract, neither could the repudiation of 
sponsalia� However, such an inference requires a great deal to be read into D� 24,2,2: 
Gaius’ stated purpose in referring to the form of words typically used to end sponsalia 
was to draw a parallel with the form of words typically used to end a marriage� The 
importance of certainty and clarity for both parties in such situations is obvious16), and 
it seems unwise to go further, and to deduce that Gaius meant to say that a l l  the legal 
13) Kupiszewski , Verlöbnis I (Fn� 4) 75 (although Kupiszweski is not seeking to 
argue that sponsalia had similar legal effects to those contracts)�
14) Ulpian’s Liber Singularis de Sponsalibus is excerpted at 23,1,2 and 23,1,12; for 
Ulpian’s methods and priorities, see A� Honoré , Ulpian: Pioneer of Human Rights, 
Oxford 2002� 
15) Translation  A� Watson  (ed�), The Digest of Justinian, 1985�
16) Cf� D� 24,2,3 (Paul� 35 ad ed�)�
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consequences of such repudiations were identical in both marriages and betrothals� 
The consideration of this text also provides a good opportunity to address a broader 
argument that the law on sponsalia developed by tracking developments in the law of 
marriage: As free marriage became more widespread, so, it is said, it became “illogi-
cal” for sponsalia to continue to create binding legal obligations17)� This equalisation 
between marriage and betrothal might be appealingly elegant, but it is not, as Corbett 
pointed out, logically inevitable: It is perfectly coherent to give legal effect to a prom-
ise to enter a relationship in future, even if that relationship once entered can be termi-
nated at will18)� In such circumstances the claimant might find it difficult to establish 
what loss had been suffered, but that difficulty does not make a claim “illogical”, it 
simply makes it problematic to quantify�
The second text to consider is Paul� 15 resp�, in which Paul is reported as denying 
a claim to enforce a poena attached to a betrothal agreement, which was stated to be-
come payable if either of the intended spouses blocked the marriage� Paul advises that 
D� 45,1,134 pr� ex stipulatione … cum non secundum bonos mores interposita sit, 
agenti exceptionem doli mali obstaturum, quia inhonestum visum est vinculo poe-
nae matrimonia obstringi sive futura sive iam contracta   
the stipulation … was contrary to sound morals, so that an action on it would be 
met by the defence of fraud� It is regarded as degrading for the bond of marriage, 
present or future, to be secured by a penalty19)� 
Berger rather tendentiously summarises this text as saying that “even a penalty 
clause attached to the pertinent agreement was void since it was considered dishon-
est that marriage be enforced by the tie of a penalty”20)� The characterisation of the 
poena as a penalty seems correct� As Berger points out elsewhere in his Dictionary, 
a stipulatio poenae can sometimes refer to losses suffered by one party that have to 
be made good by another party21); but here, in Paul’s example, the payment claimed 
is a “penalty” in the purest sense – it is a sum specified as payable without refer-
ence to any losses actually suffered by the claimant22)� The text shows, therefore, 
that the traditional form of sponsalia, in which the bride’s father promised e i ther 
the bride or  money, was no longer enforceable in Paul’s time23)� However, it seems 
unwarranted to read the text as saying that all sponsalia were unenforceable; and 
here Berger’s use of the word “even” is unfortunate� It risks misrepresenting Paul’s 
argument, and at the very least it assumes what we are seeking to investigate� For 
the text says nothing about the underlying legal effects of a betrothal where there 
is no stipulation for a penal sum and the disappointed party has suffered loss by its 
repudiation; the text’s emphasis is on the penalty itself as the factor determining 
enforceability� 
D� 45,1,134 pr� is not the only text to distinguish carefully between poenae and other 
financial inducements in the context of a future marriage� In Pap� 17 quaest�, Papinian 
discusses the validity of a condition in a will: 
17) Thomas  (Fn� 4) 420� See also Kupiszewski , Verlöbnis (Fn� 4) 159�
18) Corbe t t  (Fn� 4) 11�
19) Translation Watson , Digest (Fn� 15)�
20) Berger  (Fn� 4) 713�
21) Berger  (Fn� 4) 718 “Stipulatio poenae”�
22) Cf� R � Knüte l , Stipulatio poenae, Studien zur römischen Vertragsstrafe, 1976, 
42–43�
23) Varro ling� 6,70; Kupiszewski , Verlöbnis (Fn� 4) 148�
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D� 35,1,71,1 Titio centum relicta sunt ita, ut Maeviam uxorem quae vidua est ducat: 
condicio non remittetur et ideo nec cautio remittenda est� huic sententiae non re-
fragatur, quod, si quis pecuniam promittat, si Maeviam uxorem non ducat, praetor 
actionem denegat: aliud est enim eligendi matrimonii poenae metu libertatem au-
ferri, aliud ad testamentum certa lege invitari�  
One hundred were bequeathed to Titius to take to wife the widow Maevia; the con-
dition will not be waived, nor accordingly will the undertaking� There is no conflict 
between this opinion and the fact that should someone promise money if there were 
no marriage to Maevia, the praetor would refuse an action� Depriving of free choice 
by fear of a penalty on one’s own option is one thing; to be invited into marriage by 
a will’s provision is another24)� 
Here the illegitimate pressure of the poena is emphatically contrasted with the le-
gitimate inducements offered by the provisions of the will25)�
D� 45,1,134 pr� has also been relied on, in a more subtle way, by Corbett, as show-
ing that sponsalia were not enforceable� His account of the transition from the legally 
enforceable stipulations of the early days to the classical position under which no ac-
tion lay began by stressing that the transition could not have been a straightforward 
one� There was no trace of a lex prohibiting an actio ex sponsu, he pointed out, “Yet 
the serious step of depriving the formal stipulation, when used as a promise of mar-
riage, of direct legal sanction would surely require legislative or at least magisterial 
enactment”26)� It followed, in Corbett’s view, that the stipulations must have been 
actionable for longer than had traditionally been thought� “Then”, continues Corbett, 
“another element entered� Freedom to break off an engagement or marriage came to 
be regarded as a matter of public interest in which private convention, even in strict 
form, could not prevail”27)� As textual support he relied on D� 45,1,134 pr�, but this 
text, as explained above, was expressly dealing with poenae, and, in any case, surely 
Corbett’s initial (and, in my view, compelling) point about the need for legislation to 
deprive previously valid stipulations of their legal effect still applies where the reason 
for changing the law is a new view of the public interest�
IV� Although the jurists themselves do not provide direct evidence of a change 
from enforceability to unenforceability in betrothal agreements, it has been argued that 
a secondhand account of one of their works does� That is Aulus Gellius’ summary of 
part of Servius Sulpicius’ book De Dotibus� The text is so central to the theme of this 
article that it needs to be set out in full:
Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 4,4 Quid Servius Sulpicius in libro, qui est de dotibus, 
scripserit de iure atque more veterum sponsaliorum� 1 Sponsalia in ea parte Italiae, 
quae Latium appellatur, hoc more atque iure solita fieri scripsit Servius Sulpicius in 
libro, quem scripsit de dotibus: 2 “Qui uxorem” inquit “ducturus erat, ab eo, unde 
ducenda erat, stipulabatur eam in matrimonium datum � � � iri; qui ducturus erat, iti-
dem spondebat� Is contractus stipulationum sponsionumque dicebatur “sponsalia”� 
Tunc, quae promissa erat, “sponsa” appellabatur, qui spoponderat ducturum, “spon-
sus”� Sed si post eas stipulationes uxor non dabatur aut non ducebatur, qui stipula-
batur, ex sponsu agebat� Iudices cognoscebant� Iudex quamobrem data acceptave 
non esset uxor quaerebat� Si nihil iustae causae videbatur, litem pecunia aestimabat, 
24) Translation by Watson , Digest (Fn 15)�
25) Knüte l  (Fn� 22) 52; Fayer, La Familia Romana II (Fn� 4) 58 emphasises 
these texts’ focus on penal stipulations�
26) Corbe t t  (Fn� 4) 14� 
27) Corbe t t  (Fn� 4) 14�
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quantique interfuerat eam uxorem accipi aut dari, eum, qui spoponderat, ei qui 
stipulatus erat, condemnabat�” 3 Hoc ius sponsaliorum observatum dicit Servius 
ad id tempus, quo civitas universo Latio lege Iulia data est� 4 Haec eadem Neratius 
scripsit in libro quem de nuptiis composuit� 
What Servius Sulpicius wrote in his work On Dowries about the law and practice of 
betrothals of the veteres� 1 In the book to which he gave the title On Dowries Servi-
us Sulpicius wrote that in the part of Italy known as Latium betrothals were regu-
larly contracted according to the following law and practice. 2 «One who wished 
to take a wife,» says he, «demanded of him from whom she was to be received a 
formal promise that she would be given in marriage� The man who was to take the 
woman to wife made a corresponding promise� That contract, based upon pledges 
given and received, was called sponsalia, or ‘betrothal�’ Thereafter, she who had 
been promised was called sponsa, and he who had asked her in marriage, spon-
sus� But if, after such an interchange of pledges, the bride to be was not given in 
marriage, or was not received, then he who had asked for her hand, or he who had 
promised her, brought suit on the ground of breach of contract� The court took cog-
nizance of the case� The judge inquired why the woman was not given in marriage, 
or why she was not accepted� If no good and sufficient reason appeared, the judge 
then assigned a money value to the advantage to be derived from receiving or giving 
the woman in marriage, and condemned the one who had made the promise, or the 
one who had asked for it, to pay a fine of that amount�” 3 Servius Sulpicius says 
that this law of betrothal was observed up to the time when citizenship was given 
to all Latium by the Julian law� 4 The same account as the above was given also by 
Neratius in the book which he wrote On Marriage28)�
The centrality of this text is, hopefully, obvious; but its significance is less than 
clear� Indeed, what it says about the Roman legal position in Gellius’ own day is en-
tirely inferential� Most commentators assume that Gellius was drawing his readers’ 
attention to a contrast between Latium and Rome, but Volterra points out that the text 
itself provides no compelling reason to make that assumption29)� The two previous 
texts, on the scope of the obligation under the edict of the curule aediles, and on ac-
tions following divorces seem to be concerned with the historical origins of current 
legal phenomena30); the text on betrothals could be read in exactly the same way, 
particularly as Gellius used Servius Sulpicius as his source for both the betrothals text 
and the divorces text� 
However, the gist of the passage seems to be that things were different in La-
tium until the lex Julia conferred Roman citizenship (and, with it, Roman law) on 
the inhabitants31)� But the precise point of contrast is elusive� It might be, it is true, 
between the legal consequences of betrothals in Latium and Rome32) (although, if 
28) Translation in J �C� Rol fe , The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius, London 1927, 
I, 325–327 (lightly amended)� In particular, Rolfe translates veterum in the first sen-
tence as “in early times”; I propose a more specific reference to the veteres� The issues 
are helpfully set out in Fayer, Familia Romana II (Fn� 4) 32–36� 
29) E � Vol te r ra , Osservazioni intorno agli antichi sponsali romani, in: E� Vol -
te r ra , Scritti Giuridici vol�II, Napoli 1991, 491, 499–500 (first published in Scritti 
C�A� Jemolo, V, Milano 1963, 639–657)�
30) Gell� 4,2 (edict), Gell� 4,3 (divorce)�
31) For an implicit acknowledgement that Latins had their own distinctive prac-
tices in relation to sponsalia see lex Valeria Aurelia, where the prohibition on spon­
salia as part of the public mourning of Germanicus applies only to Roman citizens; 
M�H� Crawford  (ed�), Roman Statutes, London, 1996, vol� 1, 516–517 (translat-
ed at 528)�  
32) Fayer, Familia Romana II (Fn� 4) 36 describes this as “l’opinione generale og-
gi corrente” in the (Italian) literature�
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that were the case, would the account need to be so detailed?)� But it might alterna-
tively be a contrast in who makes the promises (with Servius envisaging promises 
by the intended husband and the bride’s father in Latium, whilst Roman practice 
extended to promises made by the bride as well)� Or it might well be making the 
point that the Latins continued to insist on strict compliance with the stipulatory 
formalities associated with the veteres despite those requirements having been re-
laxed by the Romans� This interpretation would give a precise significance to Gel-
lius’ introductory allusion to veterum sponsaliorum, which is traditionally translated 
as “betrothals in early times”33), but could mean “the sponsalia of the veteres”� The 
true significance of the passage as a whole would then be that it shows that the 
move towards informality in Rome indicated in D� 23,1 had occurred by the time 
that Servius was writing� It may also be that Servius wished to draw his readers’ at-
tention to two differences between Latium and Rome: one of legal rules (iure), the 
other of custom or habit (more)� The obvious custom would be the litigation pro-
cess, the steps of which are painstakingly described in the passage� Now, if spon­
salia were not legally binding in Rome, it was hardly very illuminating to contrast 
the legal processes applicable in Latium with those used in Rome� If, on the other 
hand, sponsalia were legally enforceable in both Latium and Rome, an account of 
Latin litigation practices might be revealing� As we shall see, a claim for breach of 
sponsalia would have raised discouragingly difficult questions about loss and quan-
tification of damage; Servius may well have included his account of Latin claims to 
show that these problems were not insuperable� 
V� We now turn to consider writings not aimed at, or produced by lawyers (at 
least, in their professional capacities)� The use of such “literary” evidence has been 
commonplace in legal studies of topics such as betrothals34), but it obviously requires 
careful handling, particularly where it is included in a work of fiction� We might 
perhaps feel that the ground is safest where non-fictional material is produced by an 
author with undoubted legal expertise, conditions which are obviously satisfied in the 
work of Varro, whose De Lingua Latina discusses (in 6,69–6,72) words deriving from 
spon dere, meaning “to promise solemnly”� These include sponsa (intended bride), 
and, in 6,70, a cluster of words surrounding engagements:
Varro ling� 6,70 Si spondebatur pecunia aut filia nuptiarum causa, appellabatur et 
pecunia et quae desponsa erat sponsa; quae pecunia inter se contra sponsu rogata 
 erat, dicta sponsio; cui desponsa quae erat, sponsus; quo die sponsum erat, spon-
salis�
If money or a daughter spondebatur ‘was promised’ in connection with a marriage, 
both the money and the girl who had been desponsa ‘pledged’ were called sponsa 
‘promised, pledged’; the money which had been asked under the sponsus ‘engage-
ment’ for their mutual protection against the breaking of the agreement, was called 
a sponsio ‘guarantee deposit’; the man to whom the money or the girl was desponsa 
‘pledged’ was called sponsus ‘betrothed’; the day on which the engagement was 
made, was called sponsalis ‘betrothal day’35)� 
33) Translation by Rol fe  (Fn� 28)�
34) See, for instance, A� Watson , The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Repub-
lic, Oxford 1967, ch� 2�
35) Translation in R�G� Kent , Varro on the Latin Language (= Loeb Classical Li-
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Varro makes it clear in the following section that anyone who has deliberately used 
spondeo is bound, even if their inner desire was not to assume an obligation:
Varro ling� 6,71 Qui spoponderat filiam, despondisse dicebant, quod de sponte eius, 
id est de voluntate, exierat: non enim si volebat, dabat, quod sponsu erat alligatus: 
nam ut in comoediis vides dici: Sponden tuam gnatam filio uxorem meo? Quod 
tum et praetorium ius ad legem et censorium iudicium ad aequum existimabatur�
He who spoponderat ‘had promised’ his daughter, they said, despondisse ‘had 
promised her away’, because she had gone out of the power of his sponte ‘inclina-
tion’, that is, from the control of his voluntas ‘desire’: For even if he wished not to 
give her, still he gave her, because he was bound by his sponsus ‘formal promise’: 
For you see it said, as in comedies: Do you now promise your daughter to my son 
as wife ? This was at that time considered a principle established by the praetors 
to supplement the statutes, and a decision of the censors for the sake of fairness36)�
On the other hand, Varro also points out in 6,72 that the use of spondeo in jest would 
not create a contract� It is perhaps difficult to believe that this could have been the case 
in situations where the other party had no reason to believe that the language was not 
seriously meant; but the general point that binding obligations arise from the use of 
spondeo, and the illustration of that point with the promises made at sponsalia could 
not have been clearer� Of course, both the context and the use of the pluperfect tense 
show that Varro’s main concern was etymological� But there is no sense at all in these 
passages that the derivation of words like sponsa and sponsalia can only be explained 
by older legal rules, that no longer hold true�
Whilst H�F� Jolowicz acknowledged that Varro’s discussion indicated that sponsalia 
created legally binding obligations, he did not pursue the point, and later commenta-
tors have been resistant to accepting it37)� Watson, for instance, regards Varro’s sugges-
tion that an action ex sponsu can be brought on a betrothal as “a flight of fancy” incon-
sistent with the “evidence” given in Aulus Gellius38)� Treggiari tends to agree39)� As we 
have seen, the “evidence” of Gellius is highly ambiguous; and to dismiss as a “flight 
of fancy” an extended exposition in a work by an author who has been described as 
“Rome’s greatest scholar”, who had been praetor and had written a treatise (now lost) 
on civil law is capricious40)� Surely the fact is, as Jolowicz recognised, that the pas-
sages in Varro point very unambiguously to the legal validity of betrothal agreements�
VI� When we move beyond non-fiction to fictional literary sources, the main au-
thor to attract commentators’ attention has been Plautus, whose plays contain several 
scenes where betrothals are agreed� Most of those agreements take the form of the 
classic stipulation – spondesne? spondeo – but much has been made of one instance, 
in the Trinummus, where the characters clearly regard an engagement as having been 
concluded, the father of the bride having said spondeo, but where there has been no 
spondesne? question� For Watson this moment demonstrates that no agreements for 
brary 333), London 1938, I, 237–239�
36) Translation ibid� 239�
37) H�F� Jo lowicz , Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, Cam-
bridge 1932, 238 Fn� 3�
38) Watson ,  Persons (Fn� 34) 13�
39) Treggiar i  (Fn� 5) 144 Fn� 88�
40) See the outline of Varro’s career and work by R�A� Kas ter  in S � Horn-
b lower /A� Spawfor th /E � Eid inow (ed�), The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Ox-
ford 42012, 1441–1442�
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betrothals were actionable at the time Plautus was writing in the second century BC� 
His reasoning, essentially, is that no distinction is drawn in the plays between agree-
ments in the spondesne?­spondeo form and the less formal instance where the bride’s 
father says spondeo without the prior question� Since this latter instance “cannot be 
actionable because it lacks the prior question”, the other instances must not be action-
able either41)� Treggiari is not prepared to go quite so far� For her the Plautus texts 
suggest a legal landscape in which formally correct, legally enforceable agreements 
co-exist alongside informal, unenforceable agreements42); in such a world it must be 
up to the parties to be careful how they express themselves�
What both Watson and Treggiari have in common is a readiness to deduce pretty 
sophisticated legal points from texts that never set out to give an account of legal prin-
ciples� But, of course, Plautus, as Kupiszewski reminds us, “schrieb … kein Lehrbuch 
des Zivilrechts”43), nor was he ahead of his time in being an exponent of social real-
ism� He was a comic dramatist, and comic dramatists distort and exaggerate features 
of real life for the amusement of their audiences� Using Plautus to provide evidence 
of Roman law is peculiarly perilous, as he was adapting existing Greek plays, most 
of which are now lost, and the extent of his original contribution remains contentious� 
As Fraenkel persuasively suggests, in his definitive study of Plautus, legal elements 
essential to the plot structure of the plays can be confidently attributed to the Greek 
originals, even if those elements are given Roman legal names44)� Fraenkel seems not 
to have had sponsalia specifically in mind, but they fit into his category perfectly: 
The betrothals are significant plot incidents, which must immediately put their Roman 
authenticity in doubt� 
Even if we are determined to deduce something about Roman law from the texts 
of these plays, the conclusions must surely be more modest than those asserted by ei-
ther Watson or Treggiari� Plautus is unlikely to have set the action in a fictional legal 
framework that made no sense to its audience, and – to this extent – Treggiari is sure-
ly right to emphasise that all the characters regard the use of spondeo as a significant 
moment in the dialogue45)� But it is rather more difficult to believe (with Treggiari) 
that anything can be read into the failure to use spondesne? Are we to imagine a col-
lective intake of breath as the dramatic irony dawns on the audience that a character 
has used spondeo without its corresponding spondesne?, and that any hoped-for legal 
consequences are, therefore, in vain? It seems more likely that the audience would 
have seen each transaction, as the characters seem to do, in the same way� It is also 
difficult to accept Watson’s contention that the one instance of spondeo without a 
spondesne? must mean that even where there was  a question, no legal rights were 
conferred� It may (or may not) have been the position in Plautus’ time that a binding 
41) Watson , Persons (Fn� 34) 15�
42) Treggiar i  (Fn� 5) 143–144�
43) Kupiszewski , Verlöbnis (Fn� 4) 141�
44) E � Fraenkel , Plautine Elements in Plautus (Plautinisches im Plautus), trans� 
T� Drevikovsky/F  Muecke , Oxford 2007, 390� This material forms part of 
Fraenkel’s addenda to the 1960 Italian translation of his German original� See al-
so, to similar effect, J � Gaudemet , La conclusion des fiançailles à Rome à l’époque 
pré-classique, RIDA 1 (1948) 79, 83–84�
45) Treggiar i  (Fn� 5) 142� See also Corbe t t  (Fn� 4) 13� Gaudemet  (Fn� 44) 85 
makes a similar point about Plautus’ drama referring to contemporary usage�
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stipulation required a corresponding question and answer; the only firm evidence 
we have of the question and answer requirement is in Gaius’ Institutes written sev-
eral centuries later46)� Not surprisingly, Plautus’ characters say nothing about legal 
enforceability – this was, after all, supposed to be an entertainment – and it seems 
ill-advised to draw sweeping inferences about precise legal issues that were marginal 
to the dramatic action, were not discussed by the characters, and that require us to 
attribute a degree of legal expertise to both dramatist and intended audience that we 
have no firm reason to believe either possessed47)� Indeed, solemnly to scrutinise the 
plays of Plautus for clues about legal principles while at the same time dismissing 
Varro’s work as a “flight of fancy” seems oddly unsympathetic to both writers’ very 
different priorities� It is difficult to avoid the feeling that each author would have 
been better served if the critical attitudes applied by Watson to their works had been 
swapped round� 
While the legal effects of betrothals were at best incidental in Plautus, they were 
central in Epistle XX of Ovid’s Heroides� The poem is a dramatic monologue ad-
dressed by Acontius, a young man, to Cydippe, the girl he hopes to marry� Their 
relationship has not been going well� According to the traditional version of the 
story, Acontius had seen Cydippe sitting in the temple of the goddess Artemis at 
Deles, and had fallen in love with her� He wrote on an apple the words “I swear 
by the sacred shrine of the goddess that I will marry you”, and threw the apple at 
Cydippe’s feet� Cydippe picked it up, and read the words aloud without thinking; 
to Acontius’ disappointment she did not regard this as settling her future� Ovid’s 
poem imagines Acontius’ attempts to persuade her round� What is most interest-
ing for us is that Acontius takes what seems (at least to a modern reader) a rather 
disagreeably lega l i s t ic  approach� He invites Cydippe to reconsider the words she 
used, reminding her that invenies illic, id te spondere [“You’ll find that you used 
‘spondeo’ there”], and, although graciously admitting that there is perhaps a hint 
of trickery on his side, he insists that he was inspired by love� Love, it turns out, 
dismayingly, is a lawyer – 
Ov�, Her� 20,29–30 Dictatis ab eo feci sponsalia verbis,  
Consultoque fui iuris Amore vafer
I made the betrothal in words dictated by him,  
And I deliberately became expert in law through Love48)� 
As one of Ovid’s editors has commented, this letter has “a legalistic ring to it”49)� 
Whether, as the same editor claims, the letter “turns the very notion of law on its head” 
46) Gai� 3,92� The Digest does not require precise verbal correspondence of ques-
tion and answer: D� 45,1,1,6 (Ulpian 48 ad Sab�) expressly approves the validity of 
stipulations where the question is in one language and the answer in another�
47) Cf� Kupiszewki , Verlöbnis (Fn� 4) 154, where conclusions about the legal ef-
fects of sponsalia are deduced from silence in the plays�
48) Ov�, Heroides 20, lines 29–30 and English translation P�M� A more poetic trans-
lation is given in H� I sbe l l , Ovid, Heroides, London 2004, 204: “He wrote the bond 
of our betrothal;/ Love became a lawyer and taught me new tricks”� Cf� the transla-
tion in Anonymus , A New Translation of Ovid’s Epistles into English Prose, Lon-
don, 31767, 263: “I inscrib’d a Marriage-Contract in Words dictated by him; it was by 
following his Suggestions, that I became so expert in the Law�” ‘Marriage-Contract’ 
is perhaps suggestive of the (anonymous) translator’s view of sponsalia�
49) I sbe l l , Ovid  (Fn� 48) 202� 
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is more doubtful50); at least, it rather depends on what “the very notion of law” is, and 
the kind of law that Acontius finds himself having to rely on is clearly of a technical, 
unmeritorious kind� What is very obvious, however, is that Acontius is trying to stand 
on his legal rights, more or less acknowledging that he has no claim to the high moral 
ground� As with the Plautus texts discussed earlier, it is, of course, important to handle 
fictional sources with care; but what makes Ovid’s poem so valuable in our context is 
that it specifically argues that Cydippe’s words created a legal obligation that she was 
bound to fulfil� The case is actually a very striking one when seen against the back-
ground of D� 23,1, because the texts of that chapter have traditionally been understood 
to mean that even the use of formal stipulatory language between parties who were 
physically present could not create binding sponsalia� Yet Ovid’s description of Cy-
dippe’s predicament flatly contradicts this, and the position that it illustrates suggests 
(and supports) a more natural reading of those texts in 23,1 where jurists emphasise 
that the criteria for a valid stipulation need no longer be met by parties to sponsalia: 
The point they were making is surely that legal obligations are created despite the 
informal agreement51)� 
VII� If the interpretations set out above are accepted, the legal status of sponsalia 
is both far more straightforward than, and radically different to, what has previously 
been understood� Book 23,1 of the Digest ceases to be a kind of oddly hollowed-out 
explanation of a concept that is only relevant for certain limited aspects of infamia, 
gifts between spouses, etc� Instead it can be given its more natural meaning as an ex-
position of the principles governing the legal liabilities arising from betrothal agree-
ments� The jurists who contributed to it can be seen as writing on a topic of contem-
porary legal relevance, and as developing principles that Ulpian could trace back to 
the  veteres, rather than engaging in inconsequential chattering among themselves� Nor, 
on his interpretation, is there any mystery about Varro’s account of the legally binding 
nature of sponsalia�
There does, however, remain one puzzle� Servius in his work on dowries, as quoted 
by Aulus Gellius, discussed both the law and practices of Latins in relation to spon­
salia� If the legal point was all about different formal requirements in Latium and 
Rome, what was the difference in prac t ice? Servius’ lengthy account of the litiga-
tion process in Latium suggests that things were different in Rome; but what Servius 
describes is an entirely orthodox condictio for breach of a stipulation� Servius’ point 
must surely have been that it was unusual to see orthodox claims for damages being 
brought in Roman courts� It is easy to see how this decline in litigation might have 
come about� The most obvious damages claim following breach of sponsalia would 
have been for loss of a promised dowry – indeed, it may well be no coincidence that 
the passage was taken from Servius’ monograph on dowries, where he may have been 
commenting on how dowries had previously been claimed� The use, in classical law, 
of dotis dictio to promise a dowry would have removed such claims from the scope 
of an action to enforce sponsalia52), and there was also a significant change in the 
husband’s underlying rights� In early law the dowry was his to keep; but later the right 
50) Ibid� 
51) D� 23,1,4; D� 23,1,7�
52) Gai� 3,95a; Thomas  (Fn� 4) 263–264, particularly 264 Fn�47�
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to retain it became more and more tightly regulated, until, by the end of the Republic, 
the husband was effectively a temporary steward53)� It would, in other words, have 
become increasingly difficult to demonstrate what financial loss the fiancé had suf-
fered as a result of losing the dowry� Other losses would also have been difficult to 
quantify, particularly following the rise of free marriages, which would have made it 
impossible for a claimant to insist that he or she would inevitably have been entitled 
to certain benefits during the course of the relationship� Servius may well have been 
making the point that what made the inhabitants of Latium unusual was their persis-
tence in demanding that judges estimate losses the nature of which made them almost 
impossible to quantify accurately� It was not a point about the legal status of sponsalia, 
but about how different communities enforced their rights; a point not about law, but 
about the social practices that surrounded it� 
London Paul  Mi tche l l *) 54
53) P� Du Pless i s , Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law, Oxford 52015, 131–
134; Thomas  (Fn� 4) 428–431; J � S tag l , Favor dotis, Die Privilegierung der Mitgift 
im System des Römischen Rechts, 2009, 237–248�
*) Professor of Laws, UCL� I am grateful to M�H� Crawford, U� Roth, the Editor 
and to participants at the conference on Ancient Family Law held at UCL in April 
2015 for comments on earlier versions of this article�
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